Архив Војводине / Archives of Vojvodina

No. 113

 

REPORT OF CAPTAIN MANOJLO PEJIĆ TO THE COMMANDER OF THE BOSNIAN CHETNIK UNITS ON APRIL 14, 1942, ON THE UPRISING IN EASTERN BOSNIA, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USTASHAS AND THE COMMUNISTS, AND ON THE CHETNIKS’ RELATIONS WITH THE CROATIAN ARMY.[1]

 

PEJIĆ S. MANOJLO

aircraft captain of the 1st c.[lass]

12-IV 1942

Position

 

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE BOSNIAN CHETNIK UNITS

 

According to the commander’s verbal order to me: to inform on all the reports from the front I left to Mr. Major Dangić about the cooperation of the Ustashas with the Communists, etc. and, since the Chetnik archives were destroyed before the onslaught of the Communists, I report:

 

I . THE USTASHAS’ COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS is reflected in the following:

1.) Major Dangić was simultaneously blackmailed by both the Communists and the Ustashas;

2.) Since October 1941, after the battle near Rogatica, the Communists have never and nowhere attacked the Ustashas and the Croatian army, nor did the Croatian army and the Ustasha attack the Communists, while the Communists used every opportunity and attacked even some German soldiers and patrols;

3.) For a long time, starting from 25-1-1942. until 14-III-of this year, the positions of the Ustashas and the Croatian army and the positions of the Communists in the area of the riv.[ers] Drina – Lim – Goražde – Mt. Romanija – Sokolovići, then on Mt. Ozren and near Zavidovići, – were often at a distance of 500-1000 meters from each other, but they never fired a single bullet at each other, on the contrary, near Sokolovići they went to a spring for water and met there, and they always used Muslims for meetings, of which there are many, and in Bosnia they are mostly Ustashas and Communists.

4.) The commander of the former Zvornik sector, Captain ĆUKOVIĆ,[2] after his withdrawal from this sector when the Communists came to his sector from the rear and when he withdrew, – he organized a reconnaissance and monitoring service. He thus determined and reported that the Communists and the Ustashas held a meeting on the part of the position from the Drina to Đevanje, where the Communists allegedly held the front towards the Ustashas, and on that occasion it was agreed between them: that the Ustashas would help the Communists with weapons and ammunition, that the Communists would be at hand during the attack on the national Chetniks, to jointly establish governance in the eastern part of Bosnia, which the national Chetniks had liberated, and for this space to serve (the Communists) as a base for their march on Serbia, coordinating the action with the Communists from Bulgaria.

And indeed, the Communists had retreated three days before the Ustashas started their advance in the direction of Drinjača and Bratunac.

5.) When in the first half of March this year three Communist “proletarian” brigades crossed from Sandžak and Montenegro to the liberated part of Bosnia, they passed with all their force (main body) past the very positions of the Ustashas and the Croatian army (front near Rogatica). – even then they did not cause any, not even the slightest disturbance to each other.

6.) As soon as the Communist units approached Ham[3] Pjesak, where the Ustashas and the Croatian army were surrounded by the national Chetniks, – the Croatian army and Ustashas, sought contact with the Communists through peasant women and on all other sides, and announced that they would gladly surrender.

7.) The Communists came to the Chetnik rear, and therefore on 15-III- to Vlasenica, but after the meeting in the area of Drina-Đevanje (section Zvornik / 1: 100.000) the Communists left Vlasenica and the whole territory (except Šejković[4]) from Mt. Romanija to the Drina and traveled, passing next to the units of the Croatian army and the Ustashas, and so the Ustashas entered Vlasenica on 1-IV of this year and later the v.[illages] of Milići, Drinjača and Bratunac.[5]

8.) After the departure of the German operational army, which in January of this year operated in eastern Bosnia, the commander of the partisan unit “ČIČA”[6] before he was killed, and later the commissioner “Ilija”[7] both Jews,[8] as well as their other leaders, stated in their speeches: “Our enemies are no longer Ustashas, but our no. 1. enemies are Chetniks, and number 2. the occupation force”.

9.) Immediately after the Communists entered Vlasenica 15-III-early, their song was heard:

“Pavelić, bravo, bravo,

Everything you do, you have the right!”[9]

 

And all around the Muslim villages, Muslims’ songs were heard:

 

“Do not be afraid, Muslim brothers,

Partisans are coming to your aid!”[10]

 

During their short stay in Vlasenica and other places, in addition to killing officers, prominent Chetniks and Serbs who fell into their hands, they managed to hold several parties. At these parties of a propaganda character, Muslim women, all Muslims, were present at the places of honor, and only there were ignorant Serb peasants brought almost by force;

10.) When the Communists advanced from Podžeplje (Borika, Rogatica District) in the direction of Milići and Vlasenica with the main goal of capturing the Chetnik headquarters, – They traveled only through Muslim villages and the mountains. None of the Muslims reported about it at any time, just the oposite, their above-mentioned songs could be heard everywhere;

11.) Among others, the main connection of the Communists with the Ustashas is maintained by the Muslim MUJO HODŽIC, the commander of a Communist Muslim unit who moves with the unit wherever it is necessary to catch, strengthen and maintain that connection.

In Vlasenica only, during the short stay of the Communists there, this Hodžic and his men executed and killed in the most cruel way about 56 Serbs (officers, Chetniks and citizens) who were buried in the Muslim cemetery.

12.) After the Ustashas slaughtered all the women and children upon their arrival in Bratunac, and threw many alive into the Drina, the Chetniks and headmen from the vicinity of Bratunac whose families had been slaughtered in those days decided to attack Bratunac, which they did on the 12th of this month.

On that occasion, the Chetnik CVETINOVIĆ SPASOJE, who is now in the hospital at Užice, as far as we know, came across an Ustasha, who was in fact a Communist with a five-pointed star on his cap. At the call of this Communist to lay down his arms, Cvetanović killed him with a revolver. As can be seen, there are genuine Communists among the Ustashas in Bratunac as well.

There are more examples like this.

II. THE CROATIAN ARMY

Many of our officers (for example Captain Đuković, [11] Lieutenant Divjak[12] and others) had frequent meetings and maintained contacts with Croatian officers by couriers, according to whom they were in some military positions, at the request and wish of Croatian officers.

These officers mostly begged the Chetniks not to attack them before, warning them, because they would not offer any resistance. Captain Đuković[13] even went to Zvornik with the help of Croatian officers.

Most Croatian officers who had been Yugoslav officers do not understand the fratricidal struggle between the Croatian army and Serb Chetniks, they therefore blame the Ustashas and claim that not only is any successful struggle against Communism in the Croatian army and among the people impossible, but they are even convinced that Soviet Russia will win this war and they are afraid of that.

They approve of and sympathize with the Chetnik struggle and know what the cause is, and the Croatian commander, who was in Ham Pjesak[14] at the beginning of the uprising, reported to his government about the lawlessness of the Ustashas and the causes of the Serb Chetnik struggle in the presence of Pero Kraljević from Kraljevo Polje near Han Pjesak.

There are officers who are Germanophiles (such as Lieutenant Colonel Šimić, who was in Drinjača), but they were incapacitated in their environment by Communist propaganda.

The captured Croatian soldiers constantly declare that they will not fight against anyone and prefer to surrender to the Communists, whom they are constantly looking for, rather than to the Chetniks.

On March 3, of this year at Velja Glava (Zvornik sector), 17 Croat soldiers surrendered to the Chetniks. On my order, Lieutenant Tuševljaković[15] interrogated them and submitted a report. It was ascertained that the military personnel had not changed their underwear for full six months.

The commander of the column which operated from Mt. Romanija, Sokolovići towards Žljebovi and Han Pjesak, Lieutenant Colonel Julije Fritc,[16] in his report sent to his superior in Sarajevo (the report was captured) states: that 300 conscript soldiers, whose exercise period had expired, rebelled in his unit, so they would not fight, but energetically ask to go to their homes and they thus demoralize the other soldiers so much that he is not sure of the success of his column. Having captured the report, the Chetniks answered him mainly that, yes, when the situation is as he himself stated, he should then should forbid the throwing of women and children into the fire, which this column had done at Glasinac (mostly Ustashas).

This column followed after the destruction of a Croatian cavalry regiment in Sokolovići.

None of the captured Croatian soldiers wanted to return to Croatia. The officers, too, for ex.[ample] Lieutenant Litovski […] Old. (When the German army operated in eastern Bosnia starting […] the Chetniks left behind around 500 prisoners because of the difficulties with food and stay during the retreat to the woods (because Germans unreasonably began to disarm and capture the Chetniks, although the Chetniks were ordered to remain in their places, for there was no reason to fear the German army, which we considered to be operating against the Communists). Many of these prisoners did not want to wait for the Croatian army, but against our will, followed the Chetniks to the forest, where they lived the same way of life with them.

Croat soldiers-prisoners unanimously declare that the Croatian army is convinced that Soviet Russia will win, so that they will absolutely not fight against anyone, and that they will keep their weapons for the upcoming revolution in Croatia, which according to the Communists from proletarian brigades who came from Sandžak, should take place in Croatia on May 1 this year.

Furthermore, Croat prisoners describe the rift between the Ustashas and the Croatian army, then the one between Muslims and Catholic Croats (religious intolerance), and all this rift is based on the fact that everyone blames the Ustashas for the current chaos and bloodshed in the Croatian state.

 

III. CONCLUSION

 

1.) As the former Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Chetnik Units, I reported on all these phenomena to the Mountain Staff[17] (Major Dangić) by telephone, encrypted dispatches and written reports.

2.) The following facts are known throughout the cultured world:

– that no force, including the organized Yugoslav Army, could oppose the German armed forces so far. Consequently, it should be clear to everyone that the uprising in Bosnia, on which the people rose, is not aggressive towards anyone, but that people had to flee into the woods, before the unprecedented Ustasha massacre of the bare-handed, peaceful and industrious Serbian people;

– that the Ustashas are the ones who have now caused the current misfortune and bloodshed and forced the uprising with their bare hands and the poor Serbian people tormented by nasty twenty-years long politics;

– that all the Serbian people on the territory of the state of Croatia would reconcile with the creation of that state and be loyal to it, if there were equality, order, peace and work in it, but the Ustashas decided to slaughter whoever was Serb in Croatia within the shortest possible time so that before such danger and facing more than five hundred and eighteen thousand slaughtered like lambs, everyone was fleeing wherever one found an escape route.

There in the woods, groups, ten men’s squads, companies met, and then battalions and detachments, and all the people capable of fighting decided to defend themselves.

It is not the fault of the Chetniks that our struggle was so successful that it really shook the foundations of the CROATIAN STATE.

It is mostly true, and especially the truth from recent days, that the Croatian army and the Ustashas are not able [to] confront the action of the Serbian national Chetniks, without the help of the Communists and external help in general.

It follows therefrom that the uprising was not raised by Major Dangić, but by the Ustashas (i.e. the people themselves), and Major Dangić, as a senior officer, who found himself among his people, was elected commander of that uprising. It is not for example Major Dangić started an uprising in the Bos[nian] Krajina, Lika, Herzegovina, but the Chetnik organizations consider him their commander because he was there with his people at the time of their extermination, while many others – almost all prominent individuals – found residence in various spa resorts and other places, where they enjoy themselves waiting for the end of the war.

 

Captain,

 

former Chief of Operational

Headquarters of the Bosnian Chetnik Detachments

 

 

[1] АВ, Ф. 562, 3.1.1.2, 456-457, original in Serbian, typewritten, Cyrillic; AV, F. 562, 3.1.1.2, 449-455, copy translated into German. On the original the designation of the III K and of the officer working on the case WV, and the order to be translated. On the translation of the report into German: date of translation, April 30, 1942, marks of the offices within the BdS institution (III, i.e. SD, then IV, i.e. Gestapo), it should be sent to, several initials and illegible notes. The report was submitted to the office III A, filed in a folder entitled: (Kommunisten Ustaša) Ustasha Communists, dated: 19. 5. 42.

[2] Risto Ćuković.

[3] Han Pijesak.

[4] Šekovići.

[5] According to General Bader’s report of March 31, 1942, Chetnik forces were simultaneously attacked by the Proletarian Strike Group (Proleterska udarna grupa) and the Black Legion (Crna legija) of Ustasha Lieutenant Colonel Jure Francetić; Zbornik NOR, Book XII, Vol. 2, 266-267. See also: Pero Đukanović, Ustanak na Drini: zapisi Pere Đukano­vića, edited by Z. An­tonić, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Balkanološki institut, 1994, 172-182.

[6] Slaviša Vajner Čiča.

[7] Pavle Goranin Ilija; See: J. Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941-1945. Žrtve genocida i učesnici NOR, 377.

[8] Slaviša Vajner was not a Jew.

[9] Original (rhyming): Paveliću bravo, bravo, / Sve što radiš imaš pravo!

[10] Original (rhyming): Ne bojte se braćo muslimani, u pomoć nam idu partizani!

[11] Risto Ćuković.

[12] Vladimir Divjak.

[13] Ćuković.

[14] Han Pijesak.

[15] Rade Tuševljaković.

[16] Јulije Fritz; Tko je tko u NDH, 120 (M. Pojić).

[17]Gorski Štab.

 

This – English – edition of the book is a translation of the one in the Serbian language, published in 2022 under the title Ustaška zverstva: Zbornik dokumenata (1941–1942). As far as the corpus of the Dossier from the personal fonds of Slavko Odić is concerned – and it makes the essential body of this book – the translation team worked from its Serbian version given in the said book and not from the German original.

The Serbian edition, with the documents translated from German, was printed in the Cyrillic alphabet, which necessitated some explanations provided by the Editor, Dr. Milan Koljanin, with regard to the linguistic traits, orthography and punctuation resorted to by the translators from German into Serbian (Tatjana Janićijević, Akademija Oxford) and the Editor. Naturally enough, numerous clarifications referring to the Serbian edition do not apply on the English one in most of the aspects of translation work. Hence the need to write this Note.

To begin with, the translators basically opted for the varieties of the American English rather than British English.

Personal names in the officially processed documents are most often written in what is today considered inverse order: family name/surname first, followed by one’s first/Christian name, without a comma in between.

Originally, the documents (letters, reports, statements etc.) were written (typed) in bureaucratic style and with a page layout practised by German offices, so these traits have been retained herein, and so have the obvious spelling and/or typing errors (personal names, toponyms); the latter have been corrected in the footnotes. The parts of text/sentences which are underlined or written with spaces between letters as means of emphasis correspond to the German original and its Serbian/Croat counterpart. The same applies to whole words or lines written in capital letters.

Punctuation has been kept almost completely, except when the meaning demanded comma (usually related to the rules of word order in an English sentence). Some marks, such as hyphens, dashes or slashes may impress the Reader as outdated or misplaced. Earlier typewriters did not have buttons with parentheses, and the slash was used instead of them.

Dates are written with differing uses or omissions of period (full stop), whereby month is written in three ways: fully in letters (20 January), in Arabic numerals (e.g. 20.1.) or Roman numerals (e.g. 20.I.). In rare cases, the slash can be found in dates (e.g. 12./X. 1941), but not as a regular separator between their constituents. Years are occasionaly written without the first digit, e.g. 942 instead of 1942, which is a frequent occurrence in oral communication.

Abbreviations, other than official identification means for offices, titles or codenames (VB, MA, RSHA etc.), have been translated (e.g. ’etc.’). The translators chose to retain the Croat/Serbian abbreviation for the name of the wartime ’state’, that is, ’NDH’ is standing for Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia) instead of the less known English name (ISC). Some words were written in a shortened form for the reason of economy of expression, and the habit has been transferred to the translation, including the Editor’s intervention in the Serbian edition: Reg.[ister], Gend.[armerie], Gor[nja] Tuzla.

Footnotes in the English edition partially differ from those in the Serbian version. Some proved to be unnecessary (those that provided original names which were transliterated into the phonetical Cyrillic alphabet). New footnotes have been added by the Subeditor in order to explain/clarify the specific, locally used, words or phrases with which the Reader may not be familiar (such as slava, din, sokolski dom), or to indicate some nuances in the meaning (student, profesor). Here and there, the Reader will find notes in brackets inserted into the main body of the text by translators or the Editor where immediate understanding was needed.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the above-mentioned bureaucratic style of the presented documents mirrors the established conventions of communication in Central Europe and the Balkans of the first half of the 20th century, particularly in state and military affairs, yet also illustrates the specific ’hierarchy’ of various authorities on the occupied territories during World War Two, accentuating the relations between the German organs/institutions in power and the various offices subordinated to the administrative and military system of the Third Reich. As to the information, facts and accounts of events recorded in these documents, they are the subject of the history science and studies related thereto.

A. Č. P.